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On June 26, 1187, the Muslim Sultan Saladin crossed the river Jordan with 20,000 of his followers "“ an army consisting of roughly 12,000 light horsemen and a number of footmen to a location south of the Sea of Galilee where he and his men encamped. They had been ravaging the nearby countryside in hopes of provoking a Christian attack, but had been unsuccessful. The Frankish Christians led by King Guy in Jerusalem had also mobilized their own army and camped at the spring at Saffuriyah . Marshall W. Baldwin says that the Franks too had an army 20,000 strong, but it was different in composition. The "Latins", as they are called, were a cavalry of 1,200 heavily armored knights, 3,500 lightly armored, mounted sergeants, several thousand foot soldiers, as well as a large number of native auxiliaries as mounted bowmen . Between the two great forces the largest memorable, Christian gathering in years lay an arid terrain; the hot summer sun made travel extremely difficult, especially for large numbers. One could easily expect fatigue, dehydration, and low morale when venturing to the east of Saffuriyah until reaching the Sea of Galilee. Strategists of each side knew the consequences of traveling across the region and so, "the waiting game" was played to see who would be the one to be provoked into a trap through the valleys. Although Saladin had unified large sections of the Muslim world, his army was still not a standing one. The crusaders counted on the fact that Saladin would have trouble holding his army together for a long period of time because his soldiers were not full-time warriors. Many were also tradesmen or farmers that easily disbanded when there was no action to get back home . Saladin knew his situation and continually harassed the area of Tiberias in failed attempts to provoke the Christians into leaving Saffuriyah, until he decided on July, 2 to besiege the city itself. He moved the majority of his troops to the high ground west of Tiberias. From this location, the Muslims could block entrance to the city while still accessing water supplies from the Sea of Galilee through the eastern side of the ridge. Tiberias was poorly fortified and Saladin's well "“ supplied forces had no trouble entering its walls. Residents of the city took refuge in the citadel, including the wife of Count Raymond of Tripoli who urgently sent west for help. Upon receipt of Eschive's distress call, there was great commotion among the Christian camp and a leadership council was called. James A. Brundage argues that many of the council were in favor of a counter-attack on Saladin's troops, claiming that "they all advised that at dawn they should march out, accompanied by the Lord's Cross, ready to fight the enemy, with all the men armed and arrayed in battle formation . However, the best strategists of the Frankish army were not "proud-bouncing", battle hungry fools. They realized that they could not move easily over the terrain to Tiberias and many of them immediately agreed with Count Raymond of Tripoli . Despite that it was his wife under attack, Raymond urged King Guy of Jerusalem to stay at Saffuriyah where there was plenty of water and provisions were accessible. He persuaded the King to hold the favorable position and wait for the Muslim Saracens to come to him. It was thought that perhaps if the Muslims took Tiberias, they would be proud and cross the arid lands to Saffuriyah where they could be crushed easily . Raymond's words were sensible, advising that "Saladin might destroy the walls of the town, but these could be rebuilt; he might take captive [my] wife and men, but these could be recovered"¦do not endanger the Kingdom by endangering the field army; let Tiberias go; remain here at Saffuriyah" . Despite Brundage's ideas, other less biased sources speak of only one knight at the war council who was anti-Raymond "“ Gerard de Ridefort, leader of the Templars. Various historians argue over what exactly caused King Guy to stray from his initial inclination to stay at Saffuriyah. A most probable theory comes from Baldwin, who claims that late that night after the council, Gerard spoke with the King in private. According to Baldwin, Gerard said that Raymond was a traitor, and also implied that should the King "relinquish the city without a blow", he was a coward . Almost all sources tell how Guy was a weak-minded King and was therefore easily influenced by Gerard. What is also important to note is that Gerard and Raymond had long been rivals. Gerard disliked Raymond and therefore was more concerned with his personal agenda then the well being of the Kingdom. In addition, R.C. Smail claims that "before their reconciliation a few weeks before, Raymond had been Guy's enemy and Rival" . By taking this viewpoint, it can be seen that Raymond was looking to disgrace Guy on his first major campaign as King. However, what Smail fails to mention is the reason for which Raymond reconciled with Guy. Baldwin tells of how on May first of 1187, a raid took place in which many Christian Templars were killed. The Kingdom could not "afford the loss in manpower and morale and upon hearing the news, Raymond willingly ended his disputes with Guy in an effort to save the Kingdom . Smail's theory is harder to grasp also because looking at the army that marched, who was leading the vanguard but Raymond? It would not have been wise for Guy to place Raymond to lead his "first major campaign" had they been such great rivals; doing so would have put the effort at risk from the start. Why would Guy make the decision to allow Raymond to lead his vanguard if they were enemies? Custom would not have been sufficient reason alone15. It was possible though that Guy was compelled to answer the call of a Lady in need and that is why he was so easily swayed to march. Whatever it was that Gerard said to the King on the night of July, 2 worked because the next morning July, 3, Guy stubbornly gave the order to march to his confused followers. When Saladin heard that the Christians were heading his way, he was thrilled and removed his forces from Tiberias to set up for the attack, spreading is troops along the surrounding hillside. This was the turn of events that Saladin had hoped for; his plan had worked and the Franks would be at a disadvantage, marching through the heat without water or supply. Using his mobile horse archers, Saladin harassed the crusader forces as they marched. His archers were quick enough that they could use the hit-and-run tactic that the Muslims were famous or notorious depending on your vantagepoint for. The Christians had no real way of counter-attacking, for their army was not well equipped to handle hit-and-run attacks. In fact, the Latin army was more of a European style; they were used to marching their armies onto a field and charging at each other with their various units "“ most effective being the heavy cavalry. The main problem with this was that there was no one for the heavy cavalry to charge at because the light Muslim horse archers were not a stationary target, such as an infantry unit. The Saracens did not venture close to the crusaders either, making it difficult for the Christian infantry to do any damage. The only way the Franks may have been able to effectively attack back at the Muslims were if they were to use their own archers "“ longbowmen. However, the problem was that the bowmen had no mass target to aim at and in order to fire, they would have needed to be stationary themselves. Unfortunately for the crusaders, their army was not one that performed well on the march16. Saladin knew this and used it to his advantage. All that the crusaders could do was ignore their losses and press on. The Muslims repeated their tactic again and again; they would empty their quivers into the crusader army, then return for more arrows and repeat the attack. Joshua Prower offers an excellent construction of the formation of the crusader army and it's problems on the march: The mounted knights were preceded and probably flanked also by archers and crossbowmen, as well as by units of Turcoples, mounted archers who fought like the Saljuq or Turkish contingents. The heavy cavalry were the weakest point of the army when faced with Muslim troops far more mobile than their own. The enemy's mounted archers could shoot from well outside the range of Crusader spears and lances and thus avoid a frontal encounter with the Frankish cavalry. Once a Frankish horse was hit, the Crusader was at the mercy of the Muslim bowmen. Against their dense rain of arrows there were only Crusader foot-archers. Since they preceded and flanked the cavalry, they prescribed the rhythm of the march and, by slowing it down, made the Franks an easier target17. By the time the crusaders reached the mid-way point to Tiberias at Marescallia, they were exhausted. The rearguard, led by the Templars, had been badgered since the morning by Muslim horse archers and was trailing behind. Realizing this, Raymond stopped and King Guy tried to rally his troops. He discussed the situation with other leaders of the army and decided that there was no way that they would be able to make it the seventeen kilometers to the Sea of Galilee by nightfall18. Instead, a new route for water was planned to a spring located just outside the town of Hattin. In order to reach it, the crusaders would have to risk journeying through a narrow pass between two hills called "The Horns of Hattin". The movement would be a gamble, but it was a chance that they had to take; the spring, although through the Horns, was only five kilometers19 from their camp. They pressed on, attacked every step by the same tactic used by the Muslims from the start. Saladin saw the direction of the crusaders, he quickly moved his troops to intercept them at Marescallia. When the Franks began to march from the main road, a state of frenzy enveloped the army. The fast riding cavalry charged onward, leaving the footmen and bowmen to fend off their attackers at the flank20. When they approached the Muslim army awaiting them, the knights attempted to charge through the lines with their lances and onward to Hattin behind the enemy, but failed. The Muslims held and the knights found themselves surrounded by the enemy to the front, to each side and also enclosing to the rear, following the slow-moving footmen. King Guy saw that his men would not reach the spring that day and ordered his troops to set up camp in hopes of rallying them. The outcome of such a decision would cost the crusaders dearly. Guy has been continually criticized for ordering camp on July 3, but in reality he had no choice. His men were obviously tired and there was little hope that they would break the Muslim line. Just before nightfall, Saladin moved a large number of his troops to the Horns of Hattin and spread them out to await the crusader march the next day. From this post, Saladin had control of the Christian's goal and was able to use the spring at Hattin to supply his own troops once again. That night, his Muslims pestered the tired and thirsty Christians continually with arrows. The Muslims were rejoicing their anticipated victory as they were re-supplied from the Sea of Galilee. They saw the state of their adversary and knew that the morale of the Franks was low. Adding to their attacks of arrows, they sang and shrieked to make their presence known "“ to strike fear into the hearts of their Christian rivals. Saturday, July 4, 1187 is a landmark date to the study of the crusades. It was a day of victory for one, and of sorrow for the other. The Christians found that they could no longer retreat and were trapped; for them, it was the beginning of the end. Saladin used his main army and attacked the Templars at the crusader's flank. While the Templars defended bravely, they were overrun as the main body of Christians pressed on toward Hattin, leaving the rearguard behind without support. The crusaders developed a strategy for combat in which the success depended on the cooperation of both the knights and footmen to help each other for protection. They attempted to march their units in a formation where the infantry would guard the knights from arrow attacks with their shields, and the knights would fend off an enemy charge to the infantry with their lances. While the tactic was well possible, it failed on impact. The tired footmen routed when they came under heavy attack, scattering up the hills to the right and left. Most were slaughtered, leaving the knights extremely vulnerable21. King Guy once again ordered camp in hopes of rallying his men, but to no avail. There was complete chaos among the perishing Christians and Raymond attempted one last charge at the Muslim blockade. Instead of breaking through the line however, the Saracens quickly maneuvered and the Raymond charged straight through the center of the line without inflicting a wound22. As a result, the crusader morale diminished and many of those charging knights ran on in retreat. In hopes of tying up his victory, and making use of the favorable winds, Saladin then set fire to the grass surrounding the remaining Latin forces. From their view, the crusaders could see nothing but dense smoke as arrows rained in from overhead. The losses were great and the Christians lost their Holy Cross, which had been their spiritual inspiration, to Muslim capture. The battle was over when Saladin ordered his final advance. Few Christians escaped as thousands were captured or killed. In general, the knights were treated honorably by their conquerors and with the exception of the Templars, who were executed for their fanatical views, many were later released. The infantry on the other hand, were treated quite differently as many were either slaughtered on the spot or sold into slavery. Baldwin proves this by pointing out that "a significant observation made by one Moslem chronicler gives further evidence that the separation of the infantry from the cavalry had been decisive. He noticed that although scarcely a horse was left alive, few of the heavily armed knights were injured"23. The Christians, who should have won a conflict against Saladin, were outwitted and defeated. According to Baldwin, they were led into a trap because of "personal and political animosities particularly on the part of Gerard de Ridefort"24. Had King Guy not been persuaded to move from Saffuriyah, there might never have been a Hattin at all. Likewise, credit must be given to Saladin, whose military tactic and planning at the expense of crusader foolishness helped him to gain the upper hand. Saladin had been victorious the minute that the Christians left their water and supply, leaving themselves defenseless and unequipped. The Latin army, for the first half of the campaign, fought an enemy on the march "“ something they were not prepared to do. The Franks had fallen for the trap through the arid lands that they had hoped would be used on the Muslims. Everything that could have gone wrong with the crusader campaign did. It was only a matter of time before Saladin's victory; it was just a question of how long the Christians would hold out and where. As Baldwin notes: "This is the tragic significance of Hattin. It was a battle that perhaps need not have been fought and certainly should not have been lost"25. It was a clear case of military strategy at its best; obviously not on the part of the crusaders, but by their adversary. It was not long before Saladin went on to conquer the territories surrounding Jerusalem, and then the city itself. With Saladin spread the nightmare that the Christians had fought against so vigorously during the first crusade; with Saladin, the Mosque26 was returned to Jerusalem.
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On June 26, 1187, the Muslim Sultan Saladin crossed the river Jordan with 20,000 of his followers – an army consisting of roughly 12,000 light horsemen and a number of footmen to a location south of the Sea of Galilee where he and his men encamped. They had been ravaging the nearby countryside in hopes of provoking a Christian attack, but had been unsuccessful. The Frankish Christians led by King Guy in Jerusalem had also mobilized their own army and camped at the spring at Saffuriyah . Marshall W. Baldwin says that the Franks too had an army 20,000 strong,...
hold out and where. As Baldwin notes: "This is the tragic significance of Hattin. It was a battle that perhaps need not have been fought and certainly should not have been lost"25. It was a clear case of military strategy at its best; obviously not on the part of the crusaders, but by their adversary. It was not long before Saladin went on to conquer the territories surrounding Jerusalem, and then the city itself. With Saladin spread the nightmare that the Christians had fought against so vigorously during the first crusade; with Saladin, the Mosque26 was returned to Jerusalem.
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Bias plays a weighty role in...Bias plays a weighty role in history and in historiography and without it the study of history would not be where it is today "“ "One- sidedness lies at the heart of history"1. In saying this however bias distorts the truth, creates a preset agenda, can create untrue facts and destroys the role of history in the development of political institutions and decisions. Bias does however play a small advantageous role in history, it allows for historians to study the perspectives of various individuals, to understand why societies as well as individuals did what they did and for what purpose. Bias is a ubiquitous section of history. Firstly, "An Intelligent Person's Guide to History" states that history is based on facts, and facts are based evidence. However there is bias in evidence, all people have a bias, there is a bias in the interpretation of evidence as well as in the creation of it. Vincent also states that history itself has a bias towards the rich over the poor, the brave over the weak and the intellectuals over the stupid. Bias is built into the very foundations of history. Bias is useful for some historians as it shows perspective. The role of the historian is to "recapture the reasons which lie beneath action by recovering experience"2 and this is where the importance of bias and perspective become apparent. The study of perspective is imperative in understanding the reasons behind the actions of both individuals and society. The study of perspective is foremost as history is not just the study of the event but rather the catalyst or significance of that event. For example a historian does not only study Malcolm X and his abhor of the peaceful methods of Martin Luther King Jr. for obtaining civil liberties, but also the reasons behind his beliefs and perspective. In the words of Leopold von Ranke "wie es eigentlich gewessen"3. Although perspective and bias can play a useful role in the study of historical sources, the role it plays in the study of history and the creation of secondary sources is not so favorable. Bias is a prevalent section of history, "It is the extreme difficulty of naming any historical writers who are not well and truly biased"4. All people grow up and live with either a bias towards their society or a bias against their society, no one is neutral. Therefore as everyone has a perspective, bias finds its way into all historical writings. The study of history is accepted and promoted as "history is a response to the eternal desire of human beings to know about themselves"5, people enjoy hearing about themselves, and therefore historians have a bias and agenda to make people feel good. The role of the historian is to "interpret from recorded fact the elements of history that cannot be recorded"6 and this interpretation is where bias comes in. We all hold "different values, different backgrounds" and interpret these facts with a bias mind. Further more historians are no longer "rentiers, landowning gentry, monkish scribes, churchmen"1 the profession of historiography is "monopilised by academics"2 and employees of the state. Historians are now less obligated to search for new truths yet the "payroll historian is likely to look with tender sympathy upon the general system which produces salaries for people like him to live on"3. Bias in historians is growing as they are now biased towards those institutions that endorse the historian. Venerable Bede taught that bias creates a preset agenda. Therefore when a biased historian begins his studies, along with his preset agenda, he espouses and utilizes those sources that are of use to him and support what his is trying to prove. Those sources however that do not coincide with his agenda are disregarded. This then leads to biased and misleading history. Further more through studying the works of Venerable Bede we can see how his preset agenda and bias led to misleading history. Venerable Bede was a Christian monk who had a venerable faith in Jesus Christ, his bias and admiration of God led to the conception of various myths and miracles. His bias led to his works being discredited as he created misleading history. Through the historical works of Polybius we can see the link between political theory and history. Political decisions are so often based on the mistakes or the success of previous institutions or individuals, how often does one hear "“ "don't want to make that same mistake again". Therefore because of the influence of history over the future of political theory, it holds "power over men, over money, over opinion"4. Historians are the "foothills of society"5 because of the power they hold. Because all history is biased, historians study misleading sources, and therefore the "foothills of society" are based on lies. There is no doubt that bias plays a significant role in history, the importance of this role is somewhat debatable. Bias can destroy history and historians yet it provides valuable insight into the mindset of figures of the past.   

Bias plays a weighty role in history and in historiography and without it the study of history would not be where it is today – "One- sidedness lies at the heart of history"1. In saying this however bias distorts the truth, creates a preset agenda, can create untrue facts and...

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Unlike Cardinal Richelieu, the prime minister...Unlike Cardinal Richelieu, the prime minister of France during the early years of the Reformation, Niccolo Machiavelli never mentioned God nor did he quote the Bible to substantiate any of his arguments. He was secular, which makes him seem modern. Today, his principals on governing a state are deemed immoral; however, he would say that his methods are practical. Whilst this book was being written during the Renaissance, Italy was weak and the city-state structure was breaking down because of French and Spanish invasions. Desperately in search of a philosophy of politics to remedy this instability, Machiavelli wrote The Prince. This book is a step-by-step guidebook on how to rule by means of a ruthless dictatorship; whereas, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu by Richelieu himself advocates absolutism. As a result of the Fronde, Richelieu and many other French people alike wished for the government to be centralized under the leadership of the king which is otherwise known as an absolute monarchy. The French king, Louis XIV stated, "L'Etat "“ c'est moi," which translates to "I am the State." This statement embodies Richelieu's as well as Machiavelli's theory of government. Both books argue the importance of a strong state. In order for Machiavelli and Richelieu to have their ideas put into practice, they dedicated each of their books to the ruler of their respective states. Richelieu dedicated his book to the king of France, Louis XIII, so that his political beliefs would live on after his death through the king. Similarly, Machiavelli dedicated his book to Lorenzo de Medici, ruler of city-state, Florence so that he might receive a government job as an advisor to Lorenzo. Both writers were very humble and marginally sycophantic in their tone with regards to their dedications so as to accomplish the aforementioned goals. This is evident in the first paragraph of The Prince when Machiavelli referred to Lorenzo de Medici as ""¦Your Magnificence" Machiavelli, p.1 and Richelieu obsequiously said "when it was first Your Majesty's pleasure to give me a part to play in the management of your affairs I determined to devote my fullest efforts to the completion of your plans..." Richelieu, p.3. Machiavelli had a very different reception from Richelieu. The former was avant-garde hence the world he lived in was not quite ready for his radical views; his opportunity to return to government was totally effaced in its publication. Richelieu ideas were employed by monarchs in England, France, and many other countries because his words were tempered and thus easier for to stomach by the public. Machiavelli and Richelieu believe society is steeped in sin and full of people that cannot be trusted. Therefore, a ruler should maintain law and order by preparing himself for every contingency. Without the necessary insight, problems shall ensue. Political disorders can be quickly healed if they are seen well in advance and only a prudent ruler has such foresight; when, for lack of diagnosis, they are allowed to grow in such a way that everyone can recognize them, remedies are too late Machiavelli, p.10. Machiavelli was forewarning Lorenzo de Medici of the detriments that would proceed if quick and decisive action was not taken to stabilize the political scene in Italy. Richelieu was also in agreement. Nothing is more necessary in governing a state than foresight, since by its use one can easily prevent many evils which can be corrected only with great difficulty if allowed to transpire Richelieu, p. 80. For Richelieu, the growing threat was the Huguenots in the south of France. If they were allowed to keep an army whilst nobles also began to gain more independence, than they could pose an internal threat in the future. The state would be best served if everyone was stripped of power and all was decided by the king Richelieu, p.9. According to Machiavelli and Richelieu, when people undermine the ruler they should be punished so that he does not appear to be weak. Richelieu expressed it best, ""¦one must be inflexible in punishing those who fail to obey." This cruelty should be used until there is stability; afterwards it is not needed. A good ruler should keep up his appearance. In Chapter XVI, Machiavelli says a ruler should always have the semblance of compassion and generosity whilst underlings do his dirty work. What people believe is most important. The king wants to be loved, but, being feared is quintessential. However, hatred is not good. Hatred leads to assassinations, conspiracies, and rebellions. If a monarch uses brutality to establish power, there is no need to use brutality in the future because a little cruelty goes a long way in preventing problems later on. Machiavelli and Richelieu would agree that cruelty should only be used when necessary. There is no need to be evil as long as people think the ruler is capable of wickedness. A monarch should surround himself with "opulence" and "good advice" to keep people in awe Richelieu, p. 51. In a nutshell, appearance should take precedence over reality. Good advice can save a ruler from losing his power. Making mistakes reflects badly upon the king therefore he should choose those in office very sensibly. Nothing is more capable of ruining a state than such a procedure "“ an infallible source of all kinds of misfortune Richelieu, p.104. Machiavelli reaffirmed a careful staff selection: When they are competent and loyal he can always be considered wise, because he has been able to recognize their competence and to keep them loyal. But when they are other wise, the prince is always open to adverse criticism; because his first mistake has been in the choice of his minister Machiavelli, p.75. Although Richelieu and Machiavelli had many similar beliefs, they also had very different viewpoints on some fundamentals, such as Richelieu's proclivity to reference Christianity. In Chapter XI, Machiavelli briefly mentions God in terms of His role in maintaining principalities. Richelieu, on the other hand, from the very beginning thanks Him for blessing him with the opportunity of aiding the king rule. He went on to highlight God's major role in the reformation of the ecclesiastical state. The reign of God is the principle basic to the good government of states , and is, in fact, so absolutely necessary that without this foundation no prince can rule well nor can any state be happy or successful Richelieu, p.67. Despite the obvious dichotomy between the two on the inclusion of religion as evidence for their theories of government, they also differentiated on other issues. With Machiavelli, much of the content revolved around the protection of the state by way of military involvement. Richelieu did not touch upon this issue. The two men had very different lives and judging from Machiavelli's life in Italy, it is reasonable that he places such high importance on the militia and army. Italy was frail at the time hence very vulnerable to foreign invasions. Machiavelli had seen his countrymen fade from the Renaissance spotlight and at the time the book was being written chaos was raining down upon city-states. Naturally, Machiavelli was on the defensive whereas Cardinal Richelieu's France had maintained sway in Europe for some time and was not too worried about any attacks. Machiavelli founded the majority of the beliefs that Richelieu would call his own. Machiavelli was too straightforward; he needed to censor his language more. His stance on how one should rule was shocking to many people, so it was blacklisted by the church. His ideas would have had much more affect had he been slightly more moderate in his tone like Richelieu. Richelieu was honest but subtle; he had to be. Richelieu had much more at stake being a cardinal and a noble of the robe. Nonetheless, both men strove to advance their state by fully empowering a ruler. Richelieu wanted the king to snatch power from the nobles, the men with lofty ideals in office, and the Huguenots. That power should be encapsulated in one man, the king. A ruler should be wary of "internal subversion" and "external aggression," for those could be the sources of his downfall if he is not always conscious of the existing machinations around him Machiavelli, p.59. In the eyes of the Machiavelli and Richelieu, the king is undeniably the means and the ends by which power shall be established therefore his subjects should be ever-reliant upon his every whim, for he is the state.   

Unlike Cardinal Richelieu, the prime minister of France during the early years of the Reformation, Niccolo Machiavelli never mentioned God nor did he quote the Bible to substantiate any of his arguments. He was secular, which makes him seem modern. Today, his principals on governing a state are deemed immoral;...

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"International support for the Whites during..."International support for the Whites during the Russian civil war was woefully inadequate". How valid is this judgement? I will attempt to show that allied support for the Whites in the Russian civil war was inadequate by looking at the reasons for support and how they might impact on the level of support that was given, I will also look at the extent of support to see if it was inadequate, and finally, the relative importance of international support compared to other reasons for the White defeat on the outcome of the war to see if the lack of international support had a critical impact on the outcome of the Russian civil war. Firstly, it must be mentioned that each nation that intervened in the Russian civil war had some similar but many different reasons for doing so and that while many nations sent troops to Russia, not to help the Russians but for their own reasons, the White armies were supported much more than the Reds who had no intentional support. Equally important is the fact that the Allied nations which intervened in Russia at the time of the civil war never intended to 'crush' communism and to illustrate this; Britain had originally landed at the port of Archangel at the request of Trotsky to help fight the Germans and had been given permission to land by the Archangel Soviet. It was only after the surrender of the Russian's in World War 1 that Britain began to help the Whites. Knowing why the allied nations sent limited support for the Whites goes a long way to explaining why support was so limited. Before the end of World War 1, the Russians surrendered to the Germans, signing the treaty of Brest-Litvosk. This freed up German armies and resources on the eastern front, allowing the Germans to fight a war on one front instead of two, giving them a great advantage. So the allied nation's first reason for supporting the Whites in the Russian civil war was the restart the eastern front, stopping Germany making use of the Russian raw materials made available to them under the treaty and to make them once again spread their forces over two fronts. However, shortly after the Russians surrendered the First World War ended with an allied victory and there was no need for the allied nations to intervene to restart the Eastern front. The allied nations still did intervene however, but now their intentions had become much more 'murky'. David Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister at the time did not want to intervene in Russia, "our honourable obligations to the remnants of the Russian army, which, disregarding the treaty of Brest-Litvosk, remained in the field to fight the Germans, put us in the embarrassing position of being obligated to help one of the parties in the Russian civil war" [1] David Lloyd George. However, the creation of a coalition government in the UK in 1918 meant that David Lloyd George now had to rely on the Conservative party, who supported intervention on the side of the Whites in the Russian civil war; Lloyd George had to cave to popular pressure within his government. The Japanese saw the opportunity to gain the most out of allied intervention; they wanted to annex territory from the Russians in their time of crisis and turmoil. The Americans sent troops to Russia to prevent the Japanese from making their territorial gains. The French had lost massive investments in Russia 16 Billion Francs after the nationalisation of the Russian economy and were left without compensation. By far the most honourable intervention in the Russian civil war on the side of the Whites appeared to be the Czech Legion, a 50,000 strong force of Czech prisoners of war which had fought for the Austro-Hungarian Empire and had now been released from the Tsar's POW camps. The Czech Legions only concern at the time was to leave Russia, by way of travelling to Vladivostok were they would be transported out of Russia by Allied ships. On their way to Vladivostok, the Czech Legion was given an ultimatum by Trotsky 'join the Red army or go to the concentration camps', not wanting to join the Red army and stranded in Russia the Czech legion took over the railroad and looked for allies; the Whites. But the allied nations also wanted a stable Russia, as expressed by Woodrow Wilson, US President at the time "Europe and the world cannot be at peace if Russia is not" [2]. The French also wanted a stable, strong and friendly Russia to help them prevent Germany from becoming a military power again. With each nation intervening for their own interests and making a stable Russia quite low on their agendas, international support from the allies was doomed to fail. The extent of allied intervention in the Russian civil war and so allied support for the Whites was very limited. Lenin had expected much more intervention in the form of a 'capitalist crusade' against the newly formed Communist Russia. However allied troops in Russia only number 150,000 at their peak who were suffering from acute war weariness from the last four years of war in Europe, the nations that sent them were considerably weakened and only at the start of the road to recovery. It could be questioned whether international support would have been greater if it were not for the obstacle of the First World War. If the allied nations were stronger they may have committed more support, but then, without the First World War, which had a major impact on the Russian revolution, there may not have been a civil war to fight. Also quite significant, was that the massive allied crusade that was expected by the Reds was never even contemplated by the allied nations. What was most important though in the extent of allied support for the Whites in the Russian civil war was that without such support there would have been no civil war, in the fighting sense at least, because the immense firepower and weaponry of the Bolsheviks would have quickly overcome all armed resistance, so, even the limited support that was given was still vital to the Whites very survival. In 1918 the British and United States' attempted to get the Reds and Whites together for a peace conference which would have avoided much of the civil war. The conference was originally to take place in Paris, France. However, after the French refused permission the conference was moved to Prinkipo Island off Istanbul and was known as the Prinkipo conference. The Whites were appalled by the idea of the peace conference and had originally thought it a miscommunication from the allies for an anti-Bolshevik conference. The Prinkipo conference never materialised however due to the fact that the French had privately advised the Whites not to go and also that Winston Churchill; the only person in the British government who supported intervention to in the form of an 'international crusade against communism', he was in a minority in the view offered the Whites British support whether they went to the conference or not. This was the only time the allied nations intervened in the Russian civil war trying to stop it and not supporting either side, all over intervention was either to support the Whites or for that particular nation's own reasons. Of the three main powers involved in the Russian civil war; Britain, France and the United States only Britain made a serious commitment to the Whites and it was Britain who bore almost the entire cost of assistance to the Whites. Early in 1919 David Lloyd George laid down guidelines for British support [3]: "1. There must be not attempt to conquer Bolshevik Russia by force of arms. 2. Support would only be continued as long as it was clear that in the areas controlled by Kolchak and Denikin the population was anti-Bolshevik in sentiment. 3. The anti-Bolshevik armies must not be used to restore the old tsarist regime"¦and re-impose on the peasants the old feudal conditions under which they held their land". The last guideline made can be questioned in terms of Lloyd George's true reason; Britain did not want the old expansionist Tsarist regime back because Britain and Russia had historically been in competition for the middle-east and a return of the Tsarist regime could threaten Britain's interests there. The British government would have wanted this reason to remain private and so it would have unlikely made it into the guidelines, instead being replaced by something that would be much more acceptable and popular; the continuing freedom of the peasants which they had experienced since the Reds took over. British intervention took several forms; they provided the anti-Bolshevik forces with material such as uniforms, tanks and planes, they placed military contingents in Russia which would only perform guard duty and so not fight, but they could defend themselves if threatened. They trained White officers and helped with intelligence and communications and finally they would evacuate the remnants of the White armies after they had been defeated. The aid that Britain offered was far below what they could offer but was -as mentioned earlier- critical to the Whites' cause. French involvement has been described as 'lukewarm'. They appeared to be against the Reds and Whites making peace- as illustrated by their involvement against the Prinkipo conference- but they didn't seem to want to help either side win. The French did send support, however this can be said to have failed quite miserably, with them abandoning the territory they had not long after they landed and leaving Russia full stop. The Japanese by far sent the most troops, which was as much as 70,000 at its peak. It was originally planned by the allies for them to be deployed against Germany on the reactivated eastern front. However their intention was always to annex Russian territory. The Japanese actually opposed Kolchak and were the only allied nation to oppose the Whites. They feared that Kolchak would oppose the Japanese annexation of Russian territory. The Japanese did have support in Russia in the form of two Cossack warlords who the Japanese used to form a buffer between them and Kolchak west of Lake Baikal. Japanese intervention hurt the White armies more than anything else, Kolchak never actually controlled any territory east of Lake Baikal. In a war were the Whites were at a disadvantage in terms of material and manpower Kolchak needed all the territory he could get and so could have been put at a further disadvantage by the loss of territory to the Japanese. Aware of Japanese intention, the United States sent troops into Russia however; they were purely used as a deterrent against the Japanese and as such never engaged the White armies. It must be noted that American intervention was not selfless either, if the Japanese made territorial gain they could have become more powerful, something the Americans didn't want of a nation to which they had always been rivals, so the Americans were serving their own interests in Russia just as the Japanese were. Their policy was to let Russia settle its quarrel amongst themselves, which actually contradicts what Woodrow Wilson said about how "Europe and the world could not be at peace if Russia was not" [2] legitimising international intervention. A significant landing of allied troops was a Novorossik a short time after the end of World War 1 by a small British-French naval detachment. The French troops held Odessa and Crimea, and after a short while they came under attack from Ukrainian bandits who had found common cause with the Reds. After some intense fighting the French abandoned the territory and a full withdrawal of all French and French-controlled forces, to add insult to injury, French sailors who were stationed at Sebastopol were exposed to anti-war propaganda and mutinied. The French withdrew and this was the last of their intervention. The British part of this detachment took over Baku -were allied materials were stored- and assumed naval control of the Caspian Sea. However, this deployment was not to support the Whites, it was to stop Germany from receiving foreign aid until she agreed to the peace terms put forward by the allies at the end of the First World War. As shown above, allied support was extremely limited in terms of how they supported the Whites, of the four allied nations that sent troops to Russia, only two actually supported the Whites Britain and France, one was for their own interests American and one actually opposed the Whites Japan. The significance of the inadequate support from the allies in the White defeat must be looked at relative to the many other reasons for the defeat of the Whites and the strength of the Reds because, if international support was inadequate, then there is a suggestion that adequate support may have affected the outcome of the Russian civil war, so other reasons for White defeat must be looked at. As mentioned earlier, there would have been no civil war if there was no support for the Whites, which was vital to their cause. However, as also mentioned earlier allied support for the Whites was well under the level they could have offered and so it is possible to consider that if the allies had fully committed to supporting the Whites in offering all the support they could have then the Whites may have won, while it is impossible to know this it does offer the suggestion that while the support for the Whites was critical in their survival, the inadequacy of allied support for the Whites was important in their defeat. International support was also used by the Reds in the form of propaganda. With troops from capitalist and imperialist countries on their soil the Reds could say they were defending Russia from an imperialist invasion, as expressed by Lenin to the 'toiling workers of France, England, America and Japan'; "Workers, like a vicious dog loosed from its chain, the whole capitalist press of your countries howls for the intervention of your governments in Russian affairs, they have already started military operations. Anglo-French bandits are already shooting Russian workers"¦ They are cutting off the Russian people from their bread and force them to put their necks once more into the noose of the Paris and London stock exchanges"¦In the interests of the capital you are to be the executioners of the Russian workers revolution" [4] Lenin this could be another significant impact of the inadequate international support for the Whites, the very presence of foreign troops on Russian soil allowed the Reds to use it against the Whites but the limited number of allied forces meant they did not do much in the form of helping the Whites win, in that way, they did more harm than good. Another significant reason for the defeat of the Whites that cannot be attributed to the lack of international support was the fact that the Reds 'fought as one' whereas the Whites fought as separate armies with separate agendas, and were so very fragmented and separated by large areas of land. Most of the time the White armies could not communicate with each other to coordinate strategies and liaison between White armies consisted of brave officers who would attempt to cross enemy territory to communicate with another White army. Their armies were also made up of diverse components who only served their own interests such as the Cossacks who only obeyed the Whites when it suited them. The Reds controlled central Russia but the Whites controlled territory around Russia circumference, an overwhelming advantage to the Reds as expressed by historian Sergei Melgunov [5] "it seems to me that the movement from the periphery toward the centre is always doomed to disaster"¦it is the centre that determines the success or failure of a revolution"¦The centre controls all the technical advantages, first and foremost in the form of an established apparatus, which the periphery had to create virtually from scratch". With control of the central Russia the Reds could shift their forces from one front to another to defend endangered positions, and they had the great advantage of short communications lines. The Reds also got massive benefits from their geographical location; they controlled territory with a population of 70 million whereas the Whites only had territory of 7-8 million each, a massive numerical advantage in the Reds' favour. By 1919 the Red army had 3 million men but the White armies never exceeded 250,000. A further advantage of the Reds was that they received vast stores of materials from the old regime that had been left behind in territory which they controlled, whereas the Whites had to rely on support from foreign nations and weapons captured from enemies. And finally, the Reds benefited from having a superior railway network which was designed in a radial pattern and had its hub in Moscow in Red territory, but the rail network in the rest of Russia was poorly developed meaning the Whites did not gain any advantage from it, a massive advantage for the Reds which possibly impacted on the Red victory. All of these reasons were very important in the defeat of the Whites and most had nothing to do with allied support or lack thereof so the allied nations cannot be blamed entirely for the defeat of the Whites in the Russian civil war although they did have an important role to play. In conclusion, every nation that intervened in the Russian civil war had their own motives which mostly did not include reasons for the good of the Russian people, and even when they appeared to, it was for their own selfish reasons, whether it be for territorial gain or to prevent an expansionist regime from returning to power and threatening the interests of other nations. The reasons for limited support could have had something to do with the fact that Europe and to a lesser extent America had been at war in Europe for 4 years and all nations involved were considerably weakened from it. If there had been no war in Europe then the allied nations may have committed much more to the Whites' cause in the Russian civil war. However, the First World War can also be considered a catalyst for the Communist revolution, so without it there may not have even been a civil war so such points are difficult to make. Allied support may also have been limited because of the sentiment of many of the leaders of the allied nations at the time, for example, Woodrow Wilson thought the Russians should be left to sort things out on their own, a policy which was followed, with American troops in Russia not fighting for any side in the civil war and only for their own interests. It can be seen that the allied nations commitment to any side in the Russian civil war was 'lukewarm' at best, the only nation anywhere near committed was Great Britain who still only gave a tiny amount of support compared with the amount which could have been given, all other nations either gave a half-hearted attempt to help the Whites but then withdraw when things start to go bad, or sent troops to Russia not intending to help anyone but themselves, like the Japanese and Americans. But the question of whether this lack of allied support was important of the defeat of the Whites is most difficult to answer, certainly, the allied nations support for the Whites, while crucial to their cause, was nowhere near what could have been given, and that support from the allied nations which equalled what they had the ability to give could have had a significant impact on the war, but the Whites had their own problems which had nothing to do with the allied nations and may still have led to their defeat no matter what support was given to them. One reason, for example, was that they were extremely fragmented, each army fighting for their own cause. But the Reds had their advantages as well, like the fact that they were fighting from the centre of Russia, allowing their forces to be concentrated while White forces had to be spread thin to cover the vast areas of the circumference of Russia. They also had the superior rail network, and the vast stores of arms that had been left behind by the old regime, that came with that territory, great advantages to the Reds that may not have been overcome even with increased support for the Whites from the allied nations. And finally, that the Reds were able to use allied support for their own reasons, Using allied intervention in Russia as propaganda allowed them to come across as the defenders of a nation come under attack from invading powers, if the allies had sent sufficient support this may have been ok, but with the limited support that was sent, the Reds were able to use this as powerful propaganda, without the allied nations making that much of a difference, so, they never sent enough support to help the Whites win, but the fact that they intervened at all meant it could be used against them. So, if all of this is taken into account then the judgement "international support for the Whites in the Russian civil war was woefully inadequate" is valid, apart from the fact that without the monetary and material support for the Whites from the allies was crucial to their cause, all other intervention appeared to do more harm than good, with the limited support just being used against the Whites in Red propaganda.   

"International support for the Whites during the Russian civil war was woefully inadequate". How valid is this judgement? I will attempt to show that allied support for the Whites in the Russian civil war was inadequate by looking at the reasons for support and how they might impact on the...

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