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Gun Control
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Americans are faced with an ever-growing problem of violence. Our streets have become a battleground where the elderly are beaten for their social security checks, where terrified women are viciously attacked and raped, where teen-age gangsters shoot it out for a patch of turf to sell their illegal drugs, and where innocent children are caught daily in the crossfire of drive-by shootings. We cannot ignore the damage that these criminals are doing to our society, and we must take actions to stop these horrors. However, the effort by some misguided individuals to eliminate the legal ownership of firearms does not...
people who respect the law itself, the people who would only use firearms for legal purposes anyway. And when we give people the right to defend themselves, we find that criminals start looking for other victims out of fear that they will become the victims themselves. We must work to reduce crime in America, but we should look at the problem realistically, and develop plans that would be effective. It is obvious that gun control laws are neither realistic, nor effective in reducing crime. Therefore, we must direct our efforts toward controlling crime, not controlling legal ownership of firearms.
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As an electrician, when I make...As an electrician, when I make application for a job, the prospective employer wants to know the usual information; education, character through personal references, and professional ability from former employers. The disclosure of professional acumen is derived primarily from former employers and is limited to ability and punctuality. The object is to discover if I can accomplish the tasks expected of a master electrician in an acceptable timeframe. There is no extensive look at specific methods of mechanics or schools of thought concerning leadership, just a check to make certain that I can get the job finished on time and on budget, with the crew furnished. Selecting a Supreme Court justice is basically the same process. The President picks a nominee and the Senate checks his or her education, personal references, and past public performance; then votes yea or nay. This scenario bears out in both the debates of the Constitutional Convention and in the Federalist Papers. In the minutes of a debate dated July 21, 1787, between Madison, Randolf, and Mason of Virginia; Pickney of S. Carolina; Ellsworth of Connecticut; Morris of Pennsylvania; and Gerry, of Massachusetts, the discussion centered on who should nominate, then confirm justices. Madison made the point that the President should make the nomination because he represents the whole of the United States, and that the Senate should, ""¦let a [simple] majority reject" after stating "that he [Madison] was not anxious that two thirds should be necessary to disagree to a nomination" Indeed, in the Federalist Papers Madison favors the third option that the judicial nomination should be vested "in a single man, with the concurrence of such an assembly [the Senate]"; behind the options that "the power of appointment" should rest, "in a single man, or in a select assembly [the Senate]". The use of words like "concurrence" and "approbation" indicate that unless there is something in the character or conduct of a nominee, the Senate should "concur" with the President's pick and Madison states so in Federalist 76; "It would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity". Again in Federalist 76, "it is not likely that their [the Senate] sanction would often be refused, where there were not special and strong reasons for the refusal". Mr. Madison seems clear that the choice of magistrates should not be reduced to the advancement of partisan issues, but that the stature of such a person should be held above the fray. The refusal of Senate Democrats to accept a nominee on the basis of a candidate's political views is contrary to the framers intent. It would seem that any choice made by this President specifically, is unworthy of such a degree of impartiality considering the Senate's past conduct when the pendulum swung the other way. That thought process, brought to consensus to in the convention and detailed in Federalist 76 was designed to prevent favoritism and cronyism in the Senate by representatives from particular parts of the country, "give us the man we wish for this office, and you shall have the one you wish for that"; and to hold the President to the nomination of qualified people. The logic lies in the fact that the President, elected then as today, by electors of the state legislatures to this day there is no federal right to vote represents the whole of the country, while members of the legislative branch had ,and have, regional loyalties. It was thought that the Senate would not be likely to reject a qualified nominee of good character because they will be immediately be confronted with another nominee of the President's choice, and the second pick may not be as palatable as the first. A case in point would be the bipartisan rejection of Harriet Miers, apparently now considered less objectionable by Senate Democrats than the President's current choice of Judge Alito. The good news is that the system is working as designed and we are witness to the operation of a 216 year old machine that is running as smoothly today as the day it rolled off the line in 1789. Those who divine the myriad of conspiracies concerning the nomination of Ms. Miers I must admit that I am standing with the crowd that is scratching its collective head on that one, the predominant one being that she was a Trojan horse to make Judge Alito more palatable to Senate Democrats, need to familiarize themselves with the intent of the founders as I am sure the President has. It is as inconceivable to me that the President would act in such a cavalier manner with respect to Ms. Miers' feelings, as it is that she would participate in such a vile conspiracy.   

As an electrician, when I make application for a job, the prospective employer wants to know the usual information; education, character through personal references, and professional ability from former employers. The disclosure of professional acumen is derived primarily from former employers and is limited to ability and punctuality. The object...

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PUBLIC LAW 2002/2003: COURSEWORK 1. ...PUBLIC LAW 2002/2003: COURSEWORK 1. Unlike the U.S.A. and Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain has no special legally sanctioned document, from which it derives the authority of the main organs of government, such as Parliament. However, it must be noted that the U.K. possesses a 'constitution' defined in the wider context. The vacuum left by an unwritten constitution is filled by the "twin foundations" of Parliamentary supremacy and the rule of law, ""¦the very keystone of the law of the constitution". Hence, whilst it is ""¦emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is" in countries such as the U.S.A., Parliament in the U.K can legislate on any topic, cannot be bound by its predecessors and no body may challenge the validity the of its Acts. Furthermore, the necessary democratic condition for the rule of law in modern British society and government is the "..threefold division of labour, between a legislator , an administrative official, and an independent judge" otherwise there would be "no liberty". Thus, the following essay will seek to analyse The Human Rights Act 1998 and Devolution, two of the Blair government's constitutional reforms. The extent and impact of change will be assessed in relation to the rule of law and the degree to which the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy, if at all, has been reconciled. The inclination, that "we have no need of a Bill of Rights because we have freedom" , betrays the lack of a "systematic human rights regime" in the U.K. A fifty year failure in incorporating the ECHR into domestic law provided a long road Strasbourg to inforce individual freedoms, coupled with a poor record before it's court, as illustrated by Golder and the Sunday Times. The adoption of measures, such as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, highlighted the progression of better protection of fundamental rights in other countries with common law traditions. Cases such as Brind further revealed a serious gap in the effective legal protection of human rights in the U.K. Only incorporation of such rights would "..reduce the helplessness of the law in the face of the legislative sovereignty of Parliament which makes it difficult for the legal system to accommodate the concept of fundamental and inviolable human rights". The originality of the HRA 1998 consisted of the following key elements. All persons applying legislation now observed new interpretive duties, regardless of it's date, or type. Subordinate legislation can be disapplied if read incompatibly with Convention rights, unless it's Parent Act prevented removal of the incompatibility. The same circumstances involving Primary legislation meant a superior court could make a 'declaration of incompatibility', although the legislation continues in full force. The effect of the declaration enables the government, through 'fast track' delegated legislation, to take remedial action, resulting in the necessary amendment to the primary legislation to remove the incompatibility. All public authorities will be acting unlawfully if they act incompatibly with Convention rights, with the risk of proceedings being brought against them ; the victim relying on Convention rights as defence through application for judicial review of the public authority's decision. In the light of relevant Strasbourg decisions and jurisprudence , a remedy of 'just satisfaction' is to be provided. Lastly, a minister of the Crown in charge of a government bill must issue a statement to parliament in regards to its compatibility with the convention, this allows efficient and fair proceedings of the bill. Thus, the HRA 1998 shares similarities with the CCRF 1982 and NZBRA 1990. Like the former, it empowers the courts with interpretive duties and ensures the administrative activities of public authorities comply with the rights incorporated. Also, in justifying any interference with convention rights, the "principle of proportionality" is applied. As with the latter measure, HRA 1998 provides the notion of ministerial statement of compatibility on bill introduction, and preference of convention rights interpretation. However, HRA 1998 differs in its application to the common law and between private parties, whilst not limiting court powers in interpreting statutes compatibly with convention rights. The Act can potentially have a "horizontal effect", and extend protection beyond the state and it's agents to 'private government'. Also, the absence of the doctrine of 'implied repeal' increases the effectiveness of the Act in securing compatibility between future legislation and convention rights, with courts requiring express provision in a latter statute before deciding a convention right has been abridged. Lord Steyn declared, "[i]t is crystal clear that the carefully and subtly drafted Human Rights Act preserves the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty". Hence, despite the incompatibility of a statute, it continues to be enforceable. Unlike the U.S.A. the U.K. has no constitutional court with the power to strike down Acts of Parliament. Moreover, excluded from the definition of 'public authority', Parliament may legislate incompatibly if it chooses to do so. Yet, Parliament still bears "a heavy responsibility to ensure that it does not do so lightly, or for inadequate reasons, or inadvertently", and for this reason is guaranteed an informed consent and a set of standards to scrutinize all legislation. Therefore, the Act provides a high degree of judicial control , which has substantially altered the effects of legislation in respect to human rights. It has been noted that early predictions concerning the impact of the HRA 1998 have been exaggerated. Offen provides an early example of how courts adopted a creative approach to interpretation of legislation to avoid a declaration of incompatibility. The first declarations of incompatibility were made within a year of the Act coming into force. Despite this, it was indicated that the courts would defer to "the decisions of a representative legislative"¦within the discretionary area of judgement accorded to those bodies". Consequently, the convention is principally an instrument promoting practices of representative government. Thus, there remains a judicial restraint in the application of convention rights, with an emphasis that individuals have responsibilities as well as rights, with the result that a "balance is to be struck between the rights of the individual and the needs of society". Perhaps this highlights the creative tension between the three branches of government, enhanced further by the manifest conflict between s.3 and s.4 of the Act. Described as the "..most radical constitutional change this country has seen since the Great Reform Act of 1832" , the Labour government's commitment to secure devolution and renew efforts to establish peace caused separate legislation for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland by Westminster. Historical analysis highlights constitutional diversity and economic/political unity in the U.K. The pressures for change were influenced by unsuccessful attempts in the 1970's to establish devolved governments, through a indecisive Royal commission on the constitution, and the Scotland Act 1978 and Wales Act 1978. The Conservative Party opposition 1979-1997 to all proposals for devolution within the U.K., added to the support of the Scottish Constitutional Convention's proposed improvement upon the Scotland Act 1978. It is a sign of the asymmetric structure of the U.K. that the similarities between the three Acts seem less than the differences. In terms of representative bodies and their powers, the Scottish Parliament may make laws for Scotland on dissolved matters, i.e. education, but are subject to a list of reserved and exempt matters, i.e. defence. Hence, despite the statements resenting legislative interference from Westminster , Parliament was to "..remain sovereign in all matters" and consequently, Scottish legislative power "does not affect the power of the United Kingdom to make Laws for Scotland". Three powers, transferred matters, expected matters, reserved matters, the latter two remaining with the U.K., whilst it also retains all primary legislative powers in relation to the National Assembly for Wales "“ given only executive devolution. The Secretaries of state for each country will provide communication between their '..Parliament and Executive and between the U.K. Parliament and Government' thus providing the latter with active involvement in the former's issues, although disputes over representation of each country will arise if the majority in the assembly belongs to a different party. Therefore, Westminster preserves full capacity to repeal/amend the three Acts, at any time, without any prior process and to legislate on any aspect of their affairs. Provisions for the formation of the executive, dissolution of Parliament and electoral system differ from the Westminster models, a fact questioning the validity that the "relationship between the Scottish Executive and Scottish Parliament will be similar.." to their U.K. counterparts, as there will be no single party which will enjoy a majority in the Scottish Parliament due to proportional representation. Scotland and Wales both have electoral systems where voters cast two votes, the first for a representative for each Westminster constituency in the country, the others for members per region for each of their prospective Euro-Parliament regions. Yet, this additional-member system creates 'two classes of members in the Commons "“ those who represent constituencies and those who do not", with the latter less accountable and there exists a difference in workload. It is a system that does work in other countries, such as Germany, but this is due to the special circumstance of federalism. Northern Ireland uses single transferable voting in multi-member districts. Regarding government formation, the Scotland Act 1998 is constitutionally modern. The Scottish Parliament nominates one of its members First Minister within 28 days of a general election/vacancy in office, and they vote to approve nominated Scottish Ministers, Lord Advocate, Solicitor General and Junior Ministers, with special powers accorded to the First Minister. On the other hand, the Assembly First Secretary and Assembly Secretaries elects one of its number to Assembly First Secretary, who in turn appoints the remaining members of the Executive committee without reference to Assembly or sovereign. Furthermore, the Northern Ireland assembly elects First and Deputy First Ministers as a team, which take office only after securing the support of the triple majority, with the d'Hondt system of proportional representation being applied for ministerial positions. At government replacement, all countries have a general election followed by the nomination/election of a new government at four-year intervals. However, both Scotland and Northern Ireland have difficult early dissolution provisions, whilst there is none in the Welsh Act. The devolution Acts contain a number of weaknesses and flaws , the space for which is limited in this essay. The formula for representation at Westminster is questioned by the 'West Lothian problem'. It asks whether it is justifiable for Scottish MP's, after devolution, to continue voting for English domestic issues when there non-Scottish counterparts could not do the same with Scottish domestic affairs, and for Scottish MP's to become member of a British Parliament which has functions which were the responsibility of the Scottish Parliament. For example, all taxation for Scotland, unless it uses its limited tax-varying powers, continues to be imposed by Westminster and yet "expenditure of public money is of concern to all parts of the United Kingdom since it may directly affect the level of taxation and indirectly influence the level of a region's own expenditure". This question of Scottish representation in the House of Commons highlights the constitutional imbalance in a unitary state caused by asymmetrical devolution. The logical but politically unrealistic answer would be legislation implementing devolution all round "“ a federal state, impossible as "the needs of the various parts of the Union differ"¦the diversity of the countries which make up the United Kingdom"¦constitutes one of its greatest strengths". Others respond that this challenge can be overcome by creating devolved government at a regional level in England. However, in countries such as Italy and Spain, there has been asymmetric devolution with some regions enjoying greater powers than others, yet there is no 'West Sardinian Question' or 'West Catalonian Question'; devolution there has been perfectly workable. Another cause for tension is the unwillingness of the U.K. government to devolve extensive economic powers to the countries, requiring the latter to go cap in hand to acquire the greater part of their revenues. The resignation of Welsh Assembly First Secretary Alun Michaels, due to problems securing funds from the treasury in the application for a European Union matching grant, illustrates this. Also, the Barnett formula, developed in 1978 to avoid an annual conflict for funds between the treasury and the executive of the proposed Scottish assembly, has been criticized. Described as a "quasi-federal funding arrangement, which guarantees to Scotland and Wales a fixed proportion of the spending allocated to England", English voices have sounded out the unjust higher share of per capita identifiable in Scotland, and questioned if she really has much more greater needs than England. It must be noted there are a number of other impacts, i.e. the re-organization of each country's government departments, the new constitutional role of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the impact of HRA 1998 and the European dimension. In conclusion, the concept, in relation to both devolution and the HRA 1998, that 'the delegation of central government powers without the relinquishment of sovereignty' is to a degree correct. However, exercise of that sovereignty will be politically and legislatively constrained somewhat by the new centres of power within the U.K. and the incorporation into domestic law of fundamental freedoms. More change due to these two issues still remains a prospect for the future, i.e. a form of federalism with more government for the English regions.   

PUBLIC LAW 2002/2003: COURSEWORK 1. Unlike the U.S.A. and Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain has no special legally sanctioned document, from which it derives the authority of the main organs of government, such as Parliament. However, it must be noted that the U.K. possesses a 'constitution' defined...

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The Constitution of Australia is a...The Constitution of Australia is a written document, which came into effect when the six colonies federated to form the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901. It consists of eight chapters and 128 sections and lays down a set of laws or restraints by which the Federal Government must operate. It establishes the composition, procedures, functions, and powers of government, government authorities, such as the Governor General and other essential institutions. The Constitution is the basic framework for a civilised and well-governed Australia. However in the recent past, reason for parliamentary and federal concern has been thrust into the limelight. In addition, there has been a growing need for judicial interpretation and the ever-present reliance on convention. The Australian Constitution has several primary features. Such aspects include the preamble and covering clauses; Chapter one which establishes the Federal Parliament and the respective roles of each house; the Federal Executive Council and provisions for the Governor General are outlined in Chapter 2; Chapter 3 covers the Judiciary and establishes the role of the High Court; in Chapters 4 through 7 other issues of the constitution are founded, particularly those pertaining to the economy; and Constitutional change in outlined in Chapter 8. The preamble is an introductory statement that outlines the sources of authority and the mission, objectives and scope of the constitution. Chapter one states that Federal parliament shall consist of the Queen, the Senate and the House of Representatives sect 1. The Senate is designed to act as a States house, while the House of Representatives performs as the Peoples House. Exclusive and residual powers are fore grounded and the procedure for overcoming conflict between the two houses is also outlined. Chapter 2 focuses primarily on the Federal Executive wing of government and the Governor General. Executive power is vested in the Governor General as the Head of State; there is no mention of the executive role of the Prime Minister. The composition and procedures of the Federal Executive Council are founded in this chapter also. The Judiciary are the chief concern of Chapter 3. In this the role and foundation of the High Court is inaugurated, as well as issues surrounding appeals to the Privy Council, dealt with. Chapters 4 through 7 are written in regard to the Australian economy and trading, preservation of the states and conditions by which a new state may be started. Chapter 8, the final chapter, describes the process by which the constitution may be changed. Despite the Constitution's role as the structure of Australian political procedure and indeed the very fabric of Australian society, in the past there have been reasons for federal and parliamentary concern. The growing number of Federal powers and the diminishing number of states powers, is of immense concern to the state parliaments. A great many Commonwealth powers, under section 51, are concurrent with those of the states, and it is by this that the Commonwealth has been able to extend its control. Section 109 states that if Commonwealth legislation conflicts with state legislation, the Commonwealth immediately takes precedence, thus encroaching on what was once state political territory. In recent years there has also been growing concern over the role and powers of the Senate. Under section 53 the Senate is not able to introduce or amend money or taxation legislation, these powers reside in the H of Reps alone. In all other aspects the Senate is on equal terms with the H of Reps. However the Senate can simply reject, defer or refuse to pass money bills. The implications of this are massive, without the Supply Bills, there is no money for government or the Public Service. The powers of the governor general have also caused some unease. In effect the constitution give the G-G the power to be government. The man/woman has the power to dissolve government, is the commander and chief of the armed forces, appoint members of the Federal Executive Council, appoint senior government officials, assent and with hold assent on legislation and appoint Justices of the High Court. Section 90 gives the Commonwealth government exclusive control over the collection of customs and excise. The controversy surrounding section 90 is concerned not so much with the power it gives the Commonwealth government but instead the restrictions it places on the state governments. The limited number of rights of the individual is of concern to the government as well as all Australian citizens. As citizens, we have only three constitutional rights and rely heavily on implied rights. There has been discussion as to whether a Bill of Rights should be included, much like that of the United States. Written Constitutions, such as the Australian one, are supplemented by conventions that help shape the formal operation of politics. Conventions are rules, not laws, and thus cannot be formally enforced. In Australia many of the common conventions have been adopted from the British Westminster system. A key and vital convention to the running of this country, is that of responsible government. This implies the basic rules of politics, such as the supremacy of parliament, the executive government must enjoy the majority in the lower house of parliament and the Head of State acts on the Prime Ministers advice. Conventionally the G-G does not exercise his powers, this to is also of extreme importance, for if he/she chose to disregard these conventions he/she could essentially be government dictator. Another convention concerns casual vacancies sect 15 where by people of the same party and faction should be sent to replace a dead or resigned senator. The Senate is also meant to pass all money bills without delay, however this too is only a convention. While conventions are vital to the running of the Australian political system, they do cause concern. An example of where conventions were being blatantly disregarded and a crisis occurred was in 1975. In 1974 the Liberal opposition refused to pass the supply bills in the senate, to counter-act this Whitlam requested a double dissolution. The ALP won the general election, with only one seat short of a majority in the Senate. However this situation changed in 1975 when two ALP vacancies occurred in the Senate. Rather than follow convention and send two ALP members to replace them, two Liberal-voting independents were sent. During 1975 there was a scandal surrounding the 'Loans Affair', which led to the dismissal of Cairns and Connor. Seeing that public opinion polls were favouring the opposition Liberal, Malcolm Fraser advised that the Senate defer the Supply Bill until a General Election was called. Whitlam refused, believing that some of the opposition would cross the floor. However on the 11th of November the Governor General dismissed the Gough Whitlam and appointed Malcolm Fraser as caretaker PM. Upon this the supply bills were immediately passed and a general election called. It was a landslide victory to the Coalition. Many conventions were broken in 1975. Supply bills should be passed in the senate unless faulty; the G-G acts on the advice of the PM; replacement senators should come from the same party; the PM should call a general election if the supply bill is not passed; and the PM should have the confidence of the majority of the H of Reps. Australia's heavy reliance on convention can lead to crisis as it did in 1975, this is a cause for concern in today's politics. The difficulty in changing the constitution is also of concern. To change the constitution 50% of the population must vote yes to the question put to them and then four of the six states must also say yes. This is the only method of change. Thus in order to change something, without as much difficulty, there has been growing popularity in the use of judicial interpretation. By "re-interpreting" the constitution it can become more applicable to today's society and thus serve the population of Australia better. While the constitution has served the people of Australia well in the past, it does have certain faults and by all means needs amending in some areas. Additions regarding such subjects, as Internet censorship and individuals rights would vastly improve this document, as well make it more applicable to the 21st Century. Amending undefined areas of "grey" would also diminish some of the confusion surrounding the Australian Constitution. As Sir Robert Menzies once said: "The Constitution is the organic law"¦it ought, in my mind, be expressed in language which is clear, simple and comprehensive."   

The Constitution of Australia is a written document, which came into effect when the six colonies federated to form the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901. It consists of eight chapters and 128 sections and lays down a set of laws or restraints by which the Federal Government must operate. It...

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David Cole wrote, "our criminal justice...David Cole wrote, "our criminal justice system affirmatively depends on inequality" 5. Cole has substantial grounds for making this statement. Race and class have long been issues in the criminal justice system, but does the system "affirmatively depend on inequality?" Does the criminal justice system depend on the disparities of the people that it serves? American justice is supposed to be blind. Despite this there have been many disparities in the justice system due to racial, social class, and economic reasons. "Absent race and class disparities, the privileged among us could not enjoy as much constitutional protection of our liberties as we do"¦" Cole 5. The case of Gideon v. Wainwright can be used to illustrate this point. Cole summarizes the case: Clarence Earl Gideon, a penniless Florida man, down on his luck and charged with breaking and entering a poolroom, claims that although he can't afford a layer, he has a constitutional right to have a lawyer appointed by the state to defend him. When the Florida trial court denies his request, [Gideon] represents himself, and is convicted. From prison, [Gideon] sends a hand-written note to the Supreme Court asking it to hear his case. "¦Abe Fortas [is appointed] to argue Gideon's case, and then [the Court] rules that the Sixth Amendment guarantees indigent defendants the assistance of a lawyer in all serious criminal trials. On retrial, with a lawyer paid for by the states, Gideon is acquitted. 63 The Gideon v. Wainwright may not appear to support the previous statement: "Absent race and class disparities, the privileged among us could not enjoy as much constitutional protection of our liberties as we do"¦" Cole 5. The outcome of Gideon requires government to provide a lawyer to a defendant, "[b]ut as long as the state provides a warm body with a law degree and a bar admission, little else matters" Cole 64. Even though the state provides indigent defense counsel, most are "underpaid, overworked, and given insufficient resources to conduct an adequate investigation and defense" Cole 84. Cole states that in 1990, "[t]he national average per capita spending on local and state indigent defense was $5.37" 84. Cole also points out other facts about the ruling in Gideon v. Wainwright: One of the most remarkable facts about the constitutional right declared in Gideon v. Wainwright is that it was not a constitutional right for the first 184 years of our Constitution. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that 'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right"¦to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.' But for most of our history, this right applied only to the approximately 10 percent of criminal trials that take place in federal court, and even there is meant only that defendants who had the money to do so could hire and attorney to defend them. 65 What this establishes is the inequalities of defense in the legal system. Those defendants that cannot provide their own council are at a disadvantage since the council they are appointed is often inadequate. The judicial system has come to rely on this fact to produce convictions. The affirmative dependence of our justice system on inequality can be illustrated another way. If our justice system were based on equality, then the reversal of racial and social roles would not affect the system. But the system is dependent on inequality, Cole shows this: Imagine what kind of pressure legislatures would feel, for example, if one in three young white men were in prison or on probation or parole. Imagine what the politics of the death penalty would look like if prosecutors sought the death penalty 70 percent of the time when whites killed blacks, but only 19 percent of the time when blacks killed whites. Or imagine what our juvenile justice policies would be like if white youth charged with drug offenses were four times as likely as black youth to be tries as adults, and twice as likely to be placed outside the home. On this is certain: the nation would not accept such a situation as 'inevitable'. 151 Cole illustrates how our judicial system is dependent on inequality. Cole brings to our realization that if the roles of inequality were reversed, the judicial system would change drastically and in doing so would point out its own dependence on those inequalities. The inequalities of the justice system can also be shown in the evolution of laws. When laws begin to affect large numbers of white middle- and upper-class people, the laws begin to change. An example would involve the spread of marijuana use. Strict laws of the early and middle part of this century prohibiting the use of marijuana were imposed because the majority of users were lower-class minorities. But during the 1960s and 1970s, the use of marijuana spread though the youth of white middle- and upper-class America Cole 152. This spurred changes in the judicial system to ease the laws affecting marijuana use. Cole summarizes the situation: "When the effects of a criminal law reach the sons and daughters of the white majority, our response is not to get tough, but rather to get lenient" 153. The American justice system has never been truly equal because it has always depended on inequalities. The system could easily be changed to eliminate those inequalities, but that will not likely happen. So long as there is a majority dependent on the disparities of a minority, the system will maintain its current sanctity. In doing so, the system will affirm its dependence on inequality.   

David Cole wrote, "our criminal justice system affirmatively depends on inequality" 5. Cole has substantial grounds for making this statement. Race and class have long been issues in the criminal justice system, but does the system "affirmatively depend on inequality?" Does the criminal justice system depend on the disparities of...

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